CCP Agents in U.S. Schools, Associations, Churches
Warning Signs and Self-Protection
These agents often do not hold typical 9-to-5 jobs. Instead, they are paid to focus exclusively on community infiltration in schools, cultural associations, churches, or student organizations. Their primary duties are: collecting personal information, sowing division, promoting CCP-favorable narratives, monitoring dissent or criticism, and suppressing opposing voices through flattery or subtle coercion — all in an effort to dominate discourse and control communities.
Common Behavioral Red Flags
1. Overly Curious and Deeply Probing
They may claim to be seminary students or involved in church ministry and use this as a pretext to organize gatherings. Under the guise of “praying for you,” they probe into your vulnerabilities and deeply investigate your background, financial/asset situation, job, and social network. They initiate regular chats in an attempt to know your views on sensitive issues — but remain vague and secretive about their own background. This is a screening process to determine what level of monitoring you should be under.
2. Information Swapping
To gain your trust, they deliberately share gossip, leaked information, or personal details about others in the community — feeding your curiosity. The aim is twofold: Undermine community cohesion while building their own social capital to dominate the group; Construct a social network map, identifying each person’s weaknesses for future exploitation or coercion.
3. Connections to Unverifiable Organizations
Their personal history is often unverifiable. Their social media settings usually limit visibility to just the past three days. They may claim ties to obscure or unverifiable groups in mainland China — for example, saying they come from an “underground church,” but their church has never been investigated by the police, which is not likely. The church name, pastor, or doctrine cannot be verified and has no online presence.
4. Promoting CCP Disinformation
They may downplay or ignore well-documented historical events (e.g., June 4th in 1989, Xinjiang, Hong Kong) and frame criticism as “anti-China sentiment,” then mobilize the community to isolate dissenting voices.
5. Attempts to Form One-Sided Relationships
With individuals who express dissent, they often try to socially isolate them while simultaneously building frequent but casual personal interactions — chatting, meetups, playdates, or church talks — without ever offering real help or resources. Their goal is not mutual support but gaining access and control. If this interaction becomes routine — for example, calling you daily at exactly 6:00 or 7:00 PM — you have probably become one of their work targets.
6. Divide-and-Rule Tactics
They pit newcomers against longtime immigrants; intentionally create or escalate conflicts; and subtly win over or suppress influential community figures.
Special Risks Within Religious Organizations
Churches often emphasize inclusivity and openness, making them easy targets for CCP infiltration. They also serve many vulnerable individuals, such as new immigrants or refugees, who are most in need of support and thus more open — and easier to exploit.
Watch out for individuals who use flashy but hollow words in public prayers; Leverage volunteerism or donations for influence; and try to steer sermons or events toward nationalist or political themes.
What You Can Do to Stay Safe？
Stay Alert: Follow credible sources (e.g., FBI briefings); talk to trusted individuals familiar with the China United Front tactics.
Document Unusual Interactions: Keep records of concerning interactions.
Avoid Oversharing Personal Information, especially avoid discussing others in the group, particularly online or in unfamiliar circles.
Use Community Verification: Discreetly check with school staff, pastors, or community members to see if they’ve had similar experiences.
Report if Needed: The FBI encourages reporting foreign influence operations — submissions can be anonymous.
美国教会中可能遇到的CCP代理人及自我保护策略
他们通常不做朝九晚五的工作，只是专心经营社群，经常会通过非官方网络，渗透到学校、文化团体、教会或学生组织中。他们的主要工作是搜集个人信息、分化瓦解社群、宣传有利于CCP的叙事、监控异议或批评、并且通过各种捧杀手段，压制不同声音，夺取话语权。
常见行为警示信号：
1. 过度好奇，深度打探。
他们有时会以在神学院读书或在教会事工为名，组织聚会。期间以“为你祷告”为名，了解你的“软肋”所在，并深度挖掘你的背景、财产状况、工作和社交圈。他们会有规律地主动联系你找你聊天，尤其是你对敏感话题的看法，但对于她自己的背景却讳莫如深，经常语焉不详。（这是在考察要把你放入到哪一等级的监控）
2. 交换信息
他们会为了获取你信任，故意向你透露社区其他人的八卦、泄露信息或个人资料。满足你的八卦心。此举有两个目的：分化瓦解社群关系，借机建立以自己为中心的社会资本，争夺社群中的话语权；建立人际关系图谱，并逐个识别每个人的弱点，为将来可以各个击破/利用做准备。
3. 与无法验证的机构有关联
他们自己的历史从来无法验证。社交圈三天可见。他们声称与中国大陆一些不为人知或无法验证的组织有关联，比如声称自己来自于家庭教会，但教会名称和牧师以及教义都无从考证，没有网络存在或透明度。
4. 传播与事实不符的中共大外宣叙事
比如淡化或不回应已被充分记录的历史事件（如89+64，新疆、香港发生的事件）；将批评之声描述为“反华情绪”，并发动社群孤立发出这种声音的人。
5. 试图与你建立单方面关系
对于有异议的人，他们不仅想办法在社群中孤立你，还会试图与你建立频繁但轻松的私人关系（如聊天、见面、带小孩玩耍、或教会交谈），却从不为你提供任何实质性的帮助或资源——他们的目的仅仅是接近你，打探信息进而控制你，而非建立互惠关系。如果这种关系形成了规律，比如每天下午6：00或7：00准时打电话给你，那么，你已经成为他们的工作目标了。
6. 分而治之的策略
他们会：挑拨新移民与老移民之间的关系；故意制造和激化矛盾；潜移默化地拉拢/打压有话语权的人。
宗教组织中的特殊风险
教会通常强调包容和开放，CCP代理人最容易混进来。另外，教会包含许多弱势人群，如新移民或难民，他们最需要倾听和帮助，容易敞开心扉，被利用。
需要特别警惕那些在宗教场合祷告时全是假大空废话/背诵华而不实语句的人；与影响力挂钩的积极志愿者或捐赠；试图将讲道或活动引向民族主义话题的行为。
如何自我保护？
保持警觉
关注可靠的信息来源（如FBI通报）；
与了解统战政治手法的可信人士交流；
记录每一次异常互动；
避免分享自己的个人信息，避免谈论群体其他成员，尤其是在网络或新圈子中；
通过社区/学校/牧师进行核实；
私下询问他人是否也有类似遭遇；
必要时报告（FBI 鼓励举报外国影响行动，可匿名提交）。