Mao Zedong Thought: CCP's toolkit to address crises
Power logic, social control, and confronting Christian-rooted democracy
Why Is Mao Zedong Thought Resurging?
In July 2025, General Zhang Youxia（张又侠）, China’s top military official, called on the People’s Liberation Army to “re-study Mao Zedong Thought” (人民日报, 2025). This is not an isolated gesture. Historically, when China faces domestic instability or external pressure, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resurrects Maoist doctrine as a tool to address crises.
But what, exactly, is Mao Zedong Thought?
Beyond official propaganda, Maoism is not just a variant of Marxism-Leninism. It is a unique blend of revolutionary socialism with traditional Chinese authoritarian statecraft, rooted in manipulation of social conflict, suppression of pluralism, and personal power consolidation.
Core Components of Mao Zedong Thought
1. Perpetual Revolution and Social Control
Mao rejected political stabilization after the CCP seized power in 1949. Instead, he transformed “revolution” into a permanent mode of governance. Mao famously declared:
“Class struggle is not over. We must talk about it every day, every month, every year.”
(中央文献研究室, 1977, p. 67)
By continuously generating political enemies, Mao prevented the rise of independent interest groups that could threaten his authority. This logic underpinned events such as:
The Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957): Mao first encouraged intellectuals to voice criticism during the Hundred Flowers Movement, then reversed course and labeled critics as “rightists,” purging 550,000 individuals (Dikötter, 2016; 人民日报, 1957).
The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976): Mao mobilized youth to dismantle party bureaucracies and attack perceived enemies, creating factional chaos that consolidated his personal dominance (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 2006; 人民日报, 1966a, 1966b).
2. Rogue Underclass （lumpenproletariat） Mobilization and Bypassing Bureaucracy
Mao deeply distrusted bureaucratic elites. His so-called “mass line” strategy, “from the masses, to the masses”, allowed him to mobilize the marginalized underclass, bypassing traditional power structures.
Land Reform & Counter-Revolution Suppression (1950–1953): Peasants were categorized into different classes according to their possessions, from landlord, to rich peasants, to ordinary peasants, to poor peasants. The poor peasants were organized to denounce and execute landlords, seizing land and destroying the existing social hierarchy (人民日报, 1950).
Capitalist Transformation Campaigns (1955–1956): Private entrepreneurs were coerced into public-private partnerships, then stripped of assets. CCP officials derisively referred to capitalist suicides as “parachutes,” counting death tolls with perverse glee (Dikötter, 2013; 人民日报, 1956).
This constant political mobilization fragmented society and ensured that loyalty to Mao superseded all other affiliations.
3. Ideological Control and Thought Monopoly
Mao declared:
“To control thought is to control the world.”
(Mao Zedong, 1942, in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3)
He institutionalized ideological conformity by subordinating literature, education, and the media to party control (中央文献研究室, 1977). Independent intellectual activity was labeled bourgeois and purged through repeated campaigns. Examples include:
Uniform propaganda and denunciation of “bourgeois thought”
Education reforms prioritizing political loyalty over expertise
Mass political study sessions enforcing ideological conformity
This created a “one-voice system,” where deviation from official narratives was intolerable (Barme, 1996).
4. Instrumental Law and Policy Supremacy
Mao subordinated legal institutions to political imperatives. He famously stated:
“We prefer socialist weeds to capitalist seedlings.”
(中央文献研究室, 1977, p. 320)
Laws were viewed as temporary tools of class struggle. Examples include:
Show trials and public denunciations replacing judicial due process
Campaign-style law enforcement substituting regular governance (Teiwes & Sun, 1999)
This contributed to a political culture where policy, not legal norms, dictated behavior.
5. Cult of Personality
Mao fused his personal image with the destiny of the nation. Through the Little Red Book, loyalty pledges, and mass rallies, he was elevated to near-divine status as the “Great Leader, Great Teacher, Great Helmsman” (Leese, 2011).
This deification created an environment where catastrophic decisions, such as the Great Leap Forward famine or the Cultural Revolution, could not be reversed, as no one dared to question Mao’s authority.
6. Strategic Confrontation Toward Christian-Rooted Administrations
Mao’s policy toward the U.S. reflected tactical opportunism rather than ideological rigidity. During WWII, he welcomed the U.S. Dixie Mission and stated:
“We are willing to be friends with the United States.”
(Mao Zedong, 1945, in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4)
Once in power, Mao shifted to confrontation:
“Imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers.”
(Mao Zedong, 1946, cited in Chen, 1984)
Mao viewed the Christian-based Chiang Kai-shek administration and his love toward the people as overly lenient, citing his Christian ethics:
“Chiang Kai-shek is benevolent like a woman. He wants face, but he cannot strike hard.”
(中共中央党史研究室, 2005, p. 152)
Mao harbored a deep hostility toward Christian-rooted democracy, employing a calculated strategy of cooperation when weak and confrontation when strong, a pattern that still shapes Beijing’s foreign policy today.
Conclusion
Mao Zedong Thought is not merely historical doctrine. It is a living toolkit of CCP’s survival, combining continuous blood-shed class struggle, mass mobilization, ideological control, and absolute power over law.
Understanding this dynamic is essential for any contemporary analysis of China’s politics.
References
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Chen, J. (1984). China's Road to the Korean War. Columbia University Press.
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Dikötter, F. (2016). The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962–1976. Bloomsbury.
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Walder, A. G. (2015). China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed. Harvard University Press.